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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ments can neither be modified nor enforced by contempt, whereas the
majority rules refuse modification but allow contempt proceedings. It
is submitted that as to contempt the majority is the better view; otherwise
the judgment is of no practical value to the wife other than as a judicial
affirmation of the contract existing between the parties. She would be
as well off without the decree because she can enforce it only by the usual
methods of enforcing contracts. By'the same token, it is thought that
the minority view as to modification is preferable. If a judge with veto
power over the terms of the agreement approves them and sets them out
in the decree, this should be sufficient adoption of the terms to make
them a part of the decree.
In view of the distinction made in North Carolina between consent
judgments and ordinary alimony decrees, however, it is advisable that
the attorney carefully word the form of the judgment so as to preserve
in the court further rights in the cause. As seen in the Edmiundson and
Dyer cases, the subsequent rights of the parties are materially affected by
the technical form of the judgment.
HAMLIN WADE
Domestic Relations-Consequences of a Voidable Divorce Decree
In the recent case of Harmon v. Harmon,' the husband, after obtain-
ing a decree of absoulte divorce on grounds of two years separation, re-
married. Thereafter, the first wife was successful in her motion in the
cause to have the divorce decree set aside, because the clerk of court had
not mailed to her a copy of the notice of service by publication as
required by statute2 The trial judge gave an order vacating the decree,
but did not dismiss the action and ordered the clerk to make proper
service of process on the defendant wife. Upon proper service of
process, the wife filed her answer setting up as a defense to the divorce
action the cohabitation arising out of the second marriage as adulterous
and therefore a bar to her husband's action. The Supreme Court
rejected the wife's contention and affirmed the divorce decree. The
court stated that since the husband had done all that was required of him
by law and there was no evidence of any intentional wrong or fraud on
his part in the procurement of the divorce decree, his cohabitation with
the second wife up to the time he knew the decree would be set aside was
not adulterous so as to bar his right of action.
This appears to be the first case in which the Supreme Court of
North Carolina has considered the effect of an error in the procedure of
service of process by publication pursuant to N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-99.2
1245 N. C. 83, 95 S. E. 2d 355 (1956).
2 N. C. GaN. STAT. § 1-992(c) (1953): "The clerk shall mail a copy of the
notice of service of process by publication to each party whose name and residence
or place of business appear in the verified pleading or complaint. ... "
19571
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
(c) as amended in 1 953 .3 The statute now requires the clerk of court
to mail a copy of the notice of service by publication, within five days
after the issuance of the order for service, to each party whose name and
address appear in the verified pleading or sworn affidavit filed pursuant
to N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-99.4. Prior to the 1953 amendment, the clerk
of court, was not required to mail such copies. The court overlooked
or thought not .significant that portion of § 1-99.2(c), which requires the
,l rc, to make-a record of mailings in accordance with N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 2-42. If the 'clerk must make a record of these filings, it seems
-reasonable that the" court, would have required the plaintiff to have
checked the records to see if it showed a proper mailing before he was
relieved of the consequences of a subsequent marriage. However, the
court apparently did not consider that a legal duty of the plaintiff.
The Harmon case illustrates'that it may not be wise to use the first
alternative authorized under N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-994 for service of
process where 'the defendant is out "of state but his address is known.
To do so may subject the plaintiff to! the same. danger involved in the
.Harmon case through no fault of his own. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-99
states a second alternative in subsection (2), which would be safer to
use if the foreign address of the defendant is known. Subsection (2)
provides that if this alternative is taken, the procedure set out in the N. C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-1045 must be followed. Since under this alternative the
court will take jurisdiction only upon return of the statutory certificate,
the chances of a court taking jurisdiction when in fact there has been no
valid service is greatly reduced.
The Harmon case appears also to be the first case in which the
Supreme Court of North Carolina considered whether marriage under
the belief of a valid divorce constitutes adulterous cohabitation so as to
bar another divorce action, when the first divorce decree was not valid
and was later vacated. The decision is in accord with the weight of
authority in this country.0
Note also that the court gave as one of its reasons for not finding the
See Note, 31 N. C. L. REv. 391 (1953) for the changes brought about in the
procedure of service of process by the 1953 amendments.
, "If the verified pleading or affidavit conforms to the requirements of G. S.
1-98.4, and if it appears to the satisfaction of the judge or clerk that the person
to be served cannot, after due diligence, be found in the State, the judge or clerk
shall, at the election of the plaintiff, either (1) Make an order for service of
process by publication of the notice provided for in G. S. 1-99.2 once a week for
four successive weeks in a designated newspaper . . . (2) Make an order for
service of process outside the State pursuant to G. S. 1-104."
'This statute provides that it shall be sufficient for service of process outside
the state to mail the original and a copy of the process together with a copy of such
pleading or affidavit to the sheriff or other process officer of the county or
corresponding governmental subdivision of the state where the party to be
served is located, who shall serve the same and make his return using a form as set
out in G. S. § 1-104(b).627 C. J. S., Divorce § 56(b) (3) (1941).
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cohabitation resulting from the second marriage adulterous the fact that
the husband separated from the second wife immediately upon being
advised by the court that the wife's motion to vacate the divorce decree
would be granted. This may infer that the court agrees-with the rule
that cohabitation pursuant to the second marriage after the divorce
decree has been vacated constitutes adultery, even though the second
marriage was contracted in reliance on the validity of the decree." How-
ever, the Supreme Court did not have to state what consideration will
be given to a lapse of time in moving to have the divorce decree vacated
or the intervention of innocent third 15.arties in setting aside the decree.
The question whether the court ought to vacate or set aside a divorce
decree after the remarriage of one of the parties necessarily depends upon
the facts of the particular case, and the decision rests within the sound
discretion of the trial court. This view is supported by some cases.8
The Harmon case apparently is in accord. However, some courts have
indicated that where the plaintiff has remarried and there has been a
delay in seeking to vacate the decree, the courts will take into considera-
tion the public policy to prevent bastardizing children of the second
marriage and also the resulting injury to the innocent second wife,Iespecially where there has been no fraud or bad faith on the part of the
remarrying spouse and the-marriage is on the faith of the divorce decree.9
This matter of public policy takes on more significance when one con-
siders the general rule that upon a decree of divorce being annulled or
vacated, the marital rights, obligations and status of the parties are
revived and restored to the status in which they were before the divorce,
irrespective of a subsequent marriage or the birth of children by the
second marriage.10 So under such a rule it does harm to the innocent
second spouse and bastardizes the children of the subsequent marriage.11
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in the recent case of Patrick v.
Patrick12 has shown that it will not consider the lapse of time when the
' State v. Whitcomb, 52 Iowa 85, 2 N. W. 970 (1879) ; State v. Watson, 20
R. I. 354, 39 Atl. 193 (1898).
v See Johnson v. Johnson, 81 Cal. App. 2d 686, 185 P. 2d 49 (1947) ; Leathers
v. Stewart, 108 Me. 96, 79 Atl. 16 (1911) ; Hall v. Hall, 70 Mont. 460, 226 P.
469 (1924) ; Paynton v. Paynton, 194 Mich. 504, 160 N. W. 837 (1916).
Bussey v. Bussey, 95 N. H. 349, 64 A. 2d 4 (1949) ; Karren v. Karren, 25
Utah 187, 69 P. 465 (1902).
10 17 Am. JurR, Divorce and Separation § 463 (1938), which cited Gato v.
Christian, 112 Me. 427, 92 Atl. 489 (1914) ; McKee v. Bevins, 138 Tenn. 249, 197
S. W. 563 (1917).
" If North Carolina follows this general rule, it would appear that the plaintiff
and his second wife are no longer validly married even though the plaintiff is now
validly divorced. But see Taylor v. White, 160 N. C. 38, 75 S. E. 941 (1912).
12245 N. C. 195, 95 S. E. 2d 585 (1956). In the Patrick case, the plaintiff wife
had obtained an absolute divorce on grounds of 5 years' separation in 1929 upon
service by publication in accordance with the law then in effect. Subsequent
thereto the husband lived with and supported the wife until her death and kept him
in ignorance of such decree. Upon being appointed personal administrator of her
estate, the husband acquired knowledge of such decree and made a motion in the
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the plaintiff was guilty of some fraud. This case, however, does not
settle the question whether the delay in time would have been considered
if there had been no fraud by the plaintiff and a subsequent marriage to
another after the decree.
The only intervening factor in the Harmon case which might have
prevented the court from granting the vacation of the decree was the
remarriage by the plaintiff husband to an innocent third person. The
court apparently adopted the rule that the marriage is not itself a suf-
ficient reason for refusing to vacate or set aside the decree. This is al-
most universally held by other jurisdictions.'3 Some courts, however,
state that great caution should be exercised before it vacates or sets aside
a divorce decree where one of the parties has married again. 14 The
other extreme from the majority view is the rule in Kentucky that the
court cannot vacate a decree of divorce, even though the motion to vacate
is made during the term at which the decree was entered, if either of
the parties has married, provided there was no fraudulent acts by the
successful party.15 This problem is handled in a unique way in New
York. Where a defaulting defendant in a divorce case seeks to have
the judgment or decree set aside so that he may defend on the merits,
the trial court's order permits the defense but allows the judgment of
divorce to stand until the trial of the issues in the divorce action, with
a proviso that if the defense is sustained the judgment should be set
aside; but if the defendant is unsuccessful the judgment should remain
in full force.16 If the Supreme Court of North Carolina adopted either
the Kentucky or New York rule, it would be clear that the plaintiff in
the Harmon case is still married to his second wife.
The Harmon situation raises the problem of whether the plaintiff
husband may be guilty of bigamy17 by his subsequent marriage. It is
usually held that the fact that one charged with bigamy believed in good
faith that he had been lawfully divorced from his first wife constitutes no
cause to have it vacated, which the trial court granted and the Supreme Court of
North Carolina affirmed. The court vacated the divorce decree on the grounds
that the wife by means of false allegations contained in her complaint perpetrated
a fraud upon the court thereby causing the court to assume jurisdiction.
Murphy v. Murphy, 200 Ark. 458, 140 S. W. 2d 416 (1940) ; Nelson v. Nelson,
7 Cal. 2d 449, 60 P. 2d 982 (1936) ; Croyle v. Croyle, 184 Md. 126, 40 A. 2d 374
(1944) ; Zirkalos v. Zirkalos, 326 Mich. 420, 40 N. W. 2d 313 (1949) ; Meyers v.
Meyers, 200 Okla. 683, 199 P. 2d 819 (1948) ; Tarr v. Tarr, 184 Va. 443, 35 S. E.
2d 401 (1945).
"4 Day v. Nothingham, 160 Ind. 408, 66 N. E. 998 (1903) ; Bussey v. Bussey,
95 N. H. 349, 64 A. 2d 4 (1949) ; Walker v. Walker, 151 Wash. 480, 276 P. 300
(1929).
" Moran v. Moran, 281 Ky. 739, 137 S. W. 2d 418 (1940) ; Bushong v. Bushong,
283 Ky. 36, 140 S. W. 2d 610 (1940).
'o Fuchs v. Fuchs, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 487 (1946).
'
7 See N. C. GEN. STAr. § 14-183 (1953).
Witt v. State, 5 Ala. App. 137, 59 So. 715 (1912) ; People v. Hartman, 130
Cal. 487, 62 Pac. 823 (1900) ; State v. Long, 44 Del. 251, 59 A. 2d 545 (1948) ; Jack-
son v. State, 21 Ga. App. 823, 95 S. E. 631 (1918) ; State v. Najjar, 1 N. J. Super.
208, 63 A. 2d 807 (1949).
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defense.18 Some of the cases have stated that the bigamy statutes do
not require any intent and that the statute puts on the defendant the duty
to be absolutely sure that his divorce decree was valid before contracting
such marriage and if he does not do so, it is a crime in the public
interest. 19  The court of Arkansas in a similar situation" to the one
in the Harmon case held that even a certificate by a clerk of court of a
decree of divorce is insufficient where the divorce decree was really void.
The probability of bigamy is strengthened by the fact that the Supreme
Court in the Harmon case cited Chisholm v. Chisholm,21 a Florida case,
in which the wife, after obtaining a divorce decree, married and cohabited
with another, but separated from the second husband before her first
husband obtained a vacation of the original decree. The court held that
her cohabitation with her second husband may technically be regarded
as bigamy but did not constitute adultery such as would preclude her
from obtaining a divorce. Although the court was talking of different
things, there is some basis for the inference that the Supreme Court of
North Carolina might hold that the defendant could be guilty of bigamy,
but not of adultery so as to bar his divorce action. In State v. Nichols,
22
the Supreme Court held that evidence that the defendant had employed
a lawyer to obtain a divorce from his first wife and had been informed
that it would require about thirty days to do so, and that he had waited
thirty days and then married the second wife, believing he was divorced,
was properly excluded. It has also been held apparently without ex-
ception in North Carolina that a bona fide belief in the invalidity of a
first marriage is not a defense to a prosecution for bigamy when in fact
that marriage was valid and subsisting 3 Following this reasoning the
plaintiff would be guilty of bigamy. It has also been held that when the
statute fixes the exceptions, the courts cannot extend it.24  Since the
North Carolina statute for bigamy lists the exceptions 25 and the Harmon
situation is not within the statutory list, it would follow that the husband
would be guilty of bigamy.
However, there are cases in this country holding that an honest but
erroneous belief, reasonably entertained, that a valid divorce has been
granted will constitute a defense to a prosecution for bigamy.26 The
See footnote 17 supra.0 Russell v. State, 66 Ark. 185, 49 S. W. 821 (1899).2 Chisholm v. Chisholm, 105 Fla. 402, 141 So. 302 (1932).
22241 N. C. 615, 86 S. E. 2d 202 (1955).
23 State v. Robbins, 28 N. C. 23 (1845) ; State v. Williams, 220 N. C. 445, 17
S. E. 2d 769 (1941).
"' State v. Zichfeld, 23 Nev. 304, 46 P. 802 (1896) ; State v. Hendrickson, 67
Utah 15, 245 P. 375 (1926).2 See N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-183 (1953).
2Robinson v. State, 6 Ga. App. 696, 65 S. E. 792 (1909) ; Lesueur v. State,
176 Ind. 448, 95 N. E. 239 (1911); State v. Sparacino, 164 La. 704, 114 So. 601
(1927) ; Turner v. State, 212 Miss. 590, 55 So. 2d 228 (1951) ; Baker v. State,
86 Neb. 775, 126 N. W. 300 (1910).
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court in the Harmon case cited with approval the quotation in State v.
Cutshall27 from Alonzo v. The State28 which explains the reason for
such a holding. That is, if one of the parties after exercising due care,
was mistaken as to a matter of fact which, had it been true, would have
rendered the alleged criminal act legal and innocent, the party so acting
under such mistake of fact would be innocent of crime. So there is some
basis for the inference that the Supreme Court might not find a person
in the situation of the husband in the Harmon case guilty of bigamy. It
certainly seems that this rule is the more logical and reasonable. To
prosecute a man for bigamy who has done all that is legally required to
get a valid divorce, and is acting in reliance upon an order of the court
granting the divorce at the time he remarries, is not reasonable or just.
It seems that a person who has acted in good faith should be entitled to
rely upon a supposedly valid divorce decree without fear of criminal
prosecution.%PARxs ALLEN ROBERTS
Execution-Supplemental Proceedings or Creditor's Bill in North
Carolina
Under the dual system of courts of law and equity that existed in
North Carolina prior to 1868, the judgment creditor had to resort to his
bill in equity' to reach property of the judgment debtor that was not
liable to execution at law. All the debtor's property was liable for his
debts excelit his legal exemptions.2 But only legal interests in tangible
personalty and realty, equities of redemption, and interests under a pas-
sive trust could be reached by execution at law.8 Legal interests in in-
tangibles and equitable interests other than those pointed out above had
to be reached by a creditor's bill in equity. The remedy in equity was
not available to a creditor who had not exhausted his legal remedies. 4
In 1868, a statutory procedure known as supplemental proceedings
was adopted whereby the judgment creditor could subject to sale certain
of the judgment debtor's property which could not be reached under
execution at law.5 . Although ' ostensibly this statute was intended to
completely replace the creditor's bill, the question arose as to whether
109 N. C. 764, 14 S. E. 107 (1891).
'15 Tex. App. 378 (1910). ..
'Also called creditor's suit, creditor's bill, and judgment creditor's bill' (to
distinguish it from general creditor's bills with which we are not here concerned).
Since the fusion of courts of law and equity, the courts frequently call thi§
proceeding an action.2 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-369 et seq. (1953).
' N. C. GEN. STAT. § 1-315 lists property that is subject to levy and sale under
execution. Here we are concerned only with property not so subject.
'Wheeler v. Taylor, 41 N. C. 225 (1849).
' CODE OF CIV. PROC. §§ 264 et seq. (1868). Now N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-352-
1-368 (1953).
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